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The proper fanctioning of the Agreement on the Application of San-
itary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) depends in part upon three international organiza-
tions, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and the International Office of 
Epiwotics (OIE). The SPS Agreement states that the sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) standards of these organizations are the benchmark 
international standards for WTO members, and recent WTO decisions 
demonstrate the importance of international standards in the settlement 
of WTO disputes involving SPS measures. The Codex, IPPC, and OIE 
also provide valuable services that benefit the WTO, such as advising 
developing countries on technical matters concerning SPS issues. 
This article describes the roles of these international organizations 
in the SPS Agreement. It also examines how the new responsibilities 
given to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE in the SPS Agreement might change 
these international bodies. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures1 (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which emerged out of the eight years of negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round, has the potential to liberalize greatly agricultural trade. One ob-
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I. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS URUGUAY RouNo, vol. 31 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
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jective of the drafters of the SPS Agreement was to harmonize the sani-
tary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures2 of the members of the WTO. 
To achieve this goal, the SPS Agreement encourages WTO members 
when creating or maintaining SPS measures to rely upon the SPS stan-
dards established by three international organizations: the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission (Codex), the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC), and the International Office of Epizootics (OIE).3 
These organizations address, respectively, issues concerning human, 
plant, and animal life and health. 
These three organizations are recognized by the world's food and 
agricultural communities as the premier international bodies for the es-
tablishment of SPS standards and for the coordination of information 
concerning SPS issues.4 The standards they set are voted upon by the 
delegates of each member country to these organizations; these dele-
gates are generally scientists employed by their respective national gov-
ernments. While the participation of their numerous members has 
ensured that these organizations have never been immune to politics, the 
Codex, IPPC, and OIE are scientific bodies whose decisions have tradi-
tionally not been the subject of great political concern. The standards 
they promulgate are advisory and thus not legally binding, so their stan-
dards rarely receive significant attention outside of scientific circles.5 
The Codex, IPPC, and OIE were created well prior to the adoption 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and they are now adjusting to the 
new role in the international trading system that was established for 
them through the SPS Agreement. The reliance on these three organiza-
tions within the SPS Agreement has already brought changes to these 
international bodies. As shown by the first three, and presently only, 
2. Sanitary measures concern human and animal health. Phytosanitary measures apply to 
plants. The SPS Agreement provides a definition of sanitary or phytosanitary measure at Annex 
lA. 
3. As the International Office of Epizootics is based in Paris, it is most often referred to by 
the acronym "OIE"; this organization's title in French is the "Office International des Epizooties." 
4. The acceptance of these organizations as the leading international bodies in their fields is 
demonstrated by their prominence in the SPS Agreement. Further, the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture noted that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TI) "officially recognized the 
Office of International Epizootics (OIE) as the forum for global standards in animal health, Codex 
Alimentarius (Codex) for food safety standards, and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC) for plant health standards." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL AND PLANT 
HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE (APHIS) TRADE SUPPORT TEAM, NAFTA AND GATT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 4 (November 2, 1995). 
5. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), at 18.62 [here-
inafter Beef Hormone - Canada Panel]; World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: EC Meas-
ures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, WT/ 
DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), at 'i 8.59 [hereinafter Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel]. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1998], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol26/iss1/4
1998] SPS Agreement 29 
WTO disputes resolved under the SPS Agreement, the European Com-
munities (EC)-beef hormone dispute, 6 the Australian-salmon dispute, 7 
and the Japan - agricultural products dispute, 8 the adjudication of major 
international trade conflicts can now turn at least in part upon the stan-
dards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Even if these standards remain 
solely advisory, the stakes for WTO members in international SPS stan-
dards have become higher, and the potential exists for an increased 
politicization of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE processes when new stan-
dards are being set. Questions have also arisen within these organiza-
tions as to their structural capabilities to fulfill their new roles. 
This article examines the provisions of the SPS Agreement that re-
late to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. It describes the importance of the 
international standards of these organizations in the outcome of disputes 
involving SPS measures resolved through the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding) of the WTO. 9 The article then discusses the Co-
dex, IPPC, and OIE themselves, how they have changed since the 
implementation of the SPS Agreement, and how they might change in 
the future. 
II. THE SPS AGREEMENT. 
References to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE are made directly and in-
directly in various articles located throughout the SPS Agreement. 
These three bodies are the only international organizations mentioned by 
name in the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, whenever the SPS Agree-
ment refers to the "relevant" or "appropriate" international organiza-
tions, it is presumably referring to the Codex, IPPC, and OIE among 
possibly others. 10 
6. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body: EC Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (Jan. 16, 1998) 
[hereinafter Beef Hormone - Appellate Report]; See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5; 
see also, Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5. 
7. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: Australia - Measures Affecting Importa-
tion of Salmon, WT/DS18/R (Jun. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia - Salmon Panel]; World Trade 
Organization, Report of the Appellate Body: Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, AB-1998-5 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australia - Salmon Appellate 
Report]. 
8. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products, WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Japan - Agricultural Products]. 
9. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 1.L.M. 
114 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
10. Although the Codex, IPPC, and OIE are the only international organizations listed in the 
SPS Agreement, other international bodies concerned with SPS issues are affiliated with the 
WTO. The following, along with the Codex, IPPC, and OIE have regular observer status at the 
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A. Harmonization. 
The Codex, IPPC, and OIE are designated to play a major role in 
the harmonization process of SPS measures envisioned in the SPS 
Agreement. Article 3 .1 obligates members to base their SPS measures 
on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations "where 
they exist." The SPS Agreement at Annex A specifically defines "inter-
national standards, guidelines or recommendations" as the standards, 
guidelines, or recommendations established by the Codex, IPPC, or OIE. 
However, Article 3.3 permits members to maintain higher standards 
than the international norm as established by international standards, 
guidelines, and recommendations if a member's measures are based 
upon science or if such measures are the "consequence of the level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appro-
priate in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5." Article 5 
requires WTO members to base their SPS measures upon risk 
assessments. 
In regard to disputes arising under the SPS Agreement, Article 3.2 
provides perhaps the most important provision pertaining to the roles of 
the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. It states that SPS measures of WTO mem-
bers that are in conformity with international standards, guidelines, or 
recommendations shall be "presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement." Therefore, in an SPS dispute adjudicated 
through the WTO' s dispute settlement process, if a member adopts 
measures that are identical or similar to the standards promulgated by 
the Codex, IPPC, or OIE, the member's measures will presumably be 
found consistent with its obligations under the SPS Agreement. 
Article 3.4 states that WTO members must participate "within the 
limits of their resources" in the relevant international bodies, and "in 
particular" the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Accordingly, members are ex-
pected to promote the development of standards within these interna-
tional organizations. Under Article 3.5, the WTO Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) will monitor in-
ternational harmonization activities and will coordinate this effort with 
the "relevant international organizations," which presumably include the 
Codex, IPPC, and OIE. 
WTO: the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of 
the United Nations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), and the International Standards Organization (ISO). World 
Trade Organization, The Committee (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/eol/e/wto03/ 
wto3_36.html>. 
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B. Risk Assessment. 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, which requires risk assessments 
for the establishment and maintenance of SPS measures, creates a role 
for the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Article 5.1 states that in developing risk 
assessments for SPS measures, members must take into consideration 
the risk assessment processes developed by the "relevant international 
organizations," which can be assumed to include the Codex, IPPC, and 
OIE. If scientific evidence is lacking concerning an SPS measure, Arti-
cle 5. 7 provides that members are permitted to adopt provisional meas-
ures based upon available information, such as that developed by the 
"relevant international organizations." Under Article 5.8, in situations 
where a member believes that a measure of another member does not 
conform with the "relevant international standards, guidelines or recom-
mendations," and the measure either interferes with or has the potential 
to interfere with that country's exports, that member can request that the 
other member provide it with explanations for the measure, and the other 
member will be obligated to respond. 
C. Differing Regional Conditions. 
Article 6 requires WTO members to recognize that pests and dis-
eases occur in distinct regions and do not necessarily inflict all areas of a 
country. For example, a member would most likely violate its WTO 
obligations if it prevented imports of all fruit from the United States due 
to the presence of the Mediterranean fruit fly in only one state, Hawaii. 11 
According to Article 6.1, members should take into consideration the 
guidelines of the "relevant international organizations" in determining 
pest- and disease-free areas. 
D. Provisions Related to Developing Countries. 
The SPS Agreement at Article 9 .1 obligates members to agree to 
provide technical assistance to developing countries to help them adjust 
to the requirements of the SPS Agreement; members may contribute this 
assistance through the "appropriate international organizations." Under 
Article 10.4, members should encourage developing countries to take 
part in the "relevant international organizations." 
The Codex, IPPC, and OIE have traditionally provided technical 
assistance to developing countries to help them address SPS threats, so 
these international organizations are well prepared to fulfill these provi-
11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, APHIS, Plant Protection and Quarantine, The Mediter-
ranean Fruit Fly (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/fsmedfty.html>. 
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sions of the SPS Agreement. 12 However, with increased technical 
assistance demands being made upon them since the end of the Uruguay 
Round, the Codex, IPPC, and OIE might in the future find it difficult to 
respond to these requests. 13 
E. Dispute Settlement. 
Article 11.3 states that the SPS Agreement does not impair the 
rights of members to utilize the dispute settlement procedures of other 
international organizations. For example, two members of both the 
WTO and IPPC could choose to settle a dispute through either the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO or through the non-
binding and seldom used dispute settlement mechanism of the IPPC. 
Under Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, dispute settlement panels 
should in disputes involving technical or scientific issues consult with 
experts in the relevant fields. In doing so, a panel may create a technical 
experts group or consult with the "relevant international organizations." 
The DSU, which is a separate instrument from the SPS Agreement, 
restates in Article 13 the provisions of the SPS Agreement that dispute 
settlement panels can obtain information from experts in the relevant 
fields. Article 13.2 of the DSU goes on to provide that "a panel may 
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group." Ap-
pendix 4 of the DSU elaborates upon the establishment and functions of 
expert review groups. 
The panels in the EC-beef hormone, the Australia-salmon, and the 
Japan-agricultural products disputes declined to form expert review 
groups. 14 The beef hormone panels expressed concerns that expert re-
view groups would have to find consensus on certain matters, which 
would complicate the groups' processes. 15 Instead of forming expert 
groups, the EC-beef hormone, Australia-salmon, and Japan-agricultural 
products panels sought scientific information from individual · experts. 16 
12. FooD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (FAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO TECH-
NICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 6 (1997); International Office of 
Epizootics, (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.oie.org/press/a_960911.htm>. 
13. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (FAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO TECH-
NICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 6 (1997). 
14. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 6.3; see also Japan -
Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <JI 6.2. 
15. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7. 
16. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.7; see Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 6.3, 6.4; see also 
Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <JI 6.2. 
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The WTO Appellate Body in the beef hormone appellate decision up-
held the ability of panels to request opinions of individual scientists 
rather than form expert review groups. 17 Further, in the beef hormone 
disputes, the Codex provided the panels with names of possible nomi-
nees to serve as experts, and a scientist from the Secretariat of the Codex 
became an expert for the panel. 18 The panels in the Australia-salmon 
and Japan-agricultural products disputes asked the advice of the OIE and 
IPPC, respectively, when selecting experts. 19 Whether or not future 
panels establish expert review groups, the Codex, IPPC, and OIE will 
likely be substantially involved in providing scientific assistance to 
panels. 
F. The SPS Committee. 
The functioning of the SPS Committee, which is established in Ar-
ticle 12, relies heavily upon the Codex, IPPC, and OIE. Article 12.2 
states that the SPS Committee is required to encourage WTO members 
to base their measures upon international standards, guidelines, or rec-
ommendations. The SPS Committee under Article 12.3 should discuss 
scientific and technical matters with international SPS organizations, 
and in particular the Codex, IPPC, and OIE, with the aim of obtaining 
the best scientific information. Article 12.6 provides that the SPS Com-
mittee may also ask these organizations to examine matters concerning 
certain SPS standards. 
Article 12.4 requires the SPS Committee to establish a procedure to 
follow the progress of international harmonization efforts and the utiliza-
tion of international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. The 
SPS Committee is expected to work with the "relevant international or-
ganizations" to develop a list of international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations that affect international trade. Members should indi-
cate which of these standards they require for the importation of prod-
ucts. If a member does not use an international standard, guideline, or 
recommendation, the member should explain why its policies vary from 
the international standard. When a member ceases using an interna-
tional standard, guideline, or recommendation, it should either explain 
its action to the Secretariat of the WTO and to the "relevant international 
organizations" or through the procedures elaborated in Annex B of the 
SPS Agreement, which concerns transparency. 
17. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at «JI 149. 
18. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at«)[«)[ 6.6, 6.10. 
19. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 16.2; see also Japan-Agricultural Prod-
ucts, supra note 8, at «JI 6.2. 
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The SPS Committee is in the process of monitoring the interna-
tional harmonization of SPS measures, and it implemented a provisional 
procedure for this purpose at its meeting in October 1997. 20 The SPS 
Committee plans to review the success of this provisional procedure 
eighteen months after the procedure's adoption. 
G. Transparency. 
Annex B of the SPS Agreement states that if a member's proposed 
SPS measure deviates from an international standard, guideline, or rec-
ommendation, or if no such international standard exists, and if the mea-
sure has a major impact on trade, the member must notify other 
countries of this proposed measure "at an early stage." If requested, the 
member must explain to other members how the proposed measure var-
ies from international standards, guidelines, or recommendations. 
III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT DECISIONS. 
At present, three disputes involving SPS measures have been re-
solved through the DSU of the WTO. The existence of international 
SPS standards played a role, directly or indirectly, in each of these dis-
putes. As demonstrated by the EC-beef hormone panel and appellate 
body decisions, the Australia-salmon panel and appellate body deci-
sions, and the panel decision in the Japan-agricultural products dispute, 
now that major international trade disputes can be influenced on the ba-
sis of international standards, the members of the WTO have incentives 
to see that the new standards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE conform with 
current or possible future national SPS measures. 
A. The Beef Hormone Dispute. 
In 1988, the European Communities prohibited the use of growth 
promoting hormones in beef production, and an import ban on hormone 
treated meat was implemented in 1989.21 The United States and Canada 
claimed that the use of hormones for growth promotion purposes in beef 
cattle was safe and posed no threat to human health. They contended 
that the European Communities' policy was scientifically unfounded and 
20. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Proce-
dure to Monitor the Process of International Harmonization, G/SPS/11 (Oct. 22, 1997). 
21. U.S. Trade Representative, 1996 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Bar-
riers (1996), at 98. 
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was designed to protect EC beef producers from competition. 22 The Eu-
ropean Communities countered by stating that beef hormones might 
threaten human health and claimed that science supported its policy. 
1. The WTO Panel Decisions. 
WTO-based consultations regarding the beef hormone controversy 
were held in 1996 between the European Communities and Canada, and 
the European Communities and the United States, but these talks did not 
result in mutually satisfactory solutions for the parties, and WTO dispute 
settlement panels were subsequently formed. 23 The two panels released 
their final reports on August 18, 1997. 
Included among their arguments before the panels, the United 
States and Canada contended that the European Communities' prohibi-
tion on the importation of hormone-treated beef violated the European 
Communities' obligations under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as the 
European Communities failed to base its measure upon international 
standards.24 The Codex maintains standards for five of the six hormones 
under dispute. 25 According to the Codex, these five hormones, when 
used according to sound veterinary practices for purposes of growth pro-
motion in beef cattle, do not pose risks to human health. 26 The panels 
determined that the European Communities' measures varied from the 
international standards of the Codex and thus were not in conformity 
with Article 3 .1. 21 
Article 3.3 makes it clear that a WTO member is not required to 
base its SPS measures upon international standards. Article 3.3 provides 
that a member may maintain higher standards than the international 
norm, but only if such measures are based upon science or if they oper-
ate "as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5." Article 5 requires 
that members base their measures upon risk assessments. 
22. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.242; see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 8.239. 
23. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 1.3. 
24. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.46, 8.47; see Beef Hormone -
U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.43, 8.44. 
25. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.61, 8.62; see Beef Hormone -
U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.58, 8.59. 
26. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.63, 8.73; see Beef Hormone -
U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.60, 8.70. 
27. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <JI 9.1; see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 9.1. 
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The European Communities claimed that risk assessments sup-
ported its position.28 The panels determined, however, that the Euro-
pean Communities failed to demonstrate that its measures were indeed 
based upon risk assessments as required in Article 3.3.29 Therefore, the 
panels held that the European Communities' policy on beef hormones 
contravened the European Communities' obligations under the SPS 
Agreement. 
2. The WTO Appellate Body Decision. 
The European Communities appealed the findings of the panels, 
and the WTO Appellate Body released its report on January 16, 1998. 
While the Appellate Body's decision rejected a number of arguments put 
forward by the panels, it affirmed the panels' conclusions that the Euro-
pean Communities' beef hormone policy violated Article 3.3 as it was 
not based upon a risk assessment. 30 In its report, the Appellate Body 
emphasized that voluntary standards of international organizations such 
as the Codex are not transformed into mandatory standards for WTO 
members.31 Rather, members are permitted under Article 3.3 to main-
tain SPS measures that are higher than the international norm (i.e., 
higher than the standards of the relevant international organizations), but 
such measures must be based upon risk assessments as described in Arti-
cle 5.32 
B. The Australia-Salmon Dispute. 
On October 5, 1995, Canada requested WTO-based consultations 
with Australia regarding Australia's ban on the importation of fresh, 
chilled, and frozen salmon from Canada. 33 Australia contended that its 
prohibition of such imports, which became operative in 1975,34 was nec-
essary to protect Australian fish from up to 24 diseases that could enter 
the country through imported salmon from Canada. 35 The establishment 
of these diseases could have damaging economic and biological conse-
quences for Australia's fisheries. 36 
28. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.111, 8.112, 8.114, 8.152; see 
Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at 'Jiii[ 8.108, 8.109, 8.lll, 8.149. 
29. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.158, 8.261, 9.1, 8.82; see Beef 
Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at <J[<J[ 8.156, 8.261, 9.l, 8.79. 
30. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at <J[<J[ 208, 209. 
31. Id. at <J[ 165. 
32. Id. at <JI 177. 
33. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <JI 1.1. 
34. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at TI 2.14, 2.15. 
35. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1'I 4.34, 4.35. 
36. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1 4.35. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1998], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol26/iss1/4
1998] SPS Agreement 37 
1. The WTO Panel Decision. 
A WTO panel was formed on April 10, 1997.37 Canada claimed 
that Australia's policy was not founded upon science and was a dis-
guised restriction to international trade. 38 Canada also contended that 
Australia violated Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as the disputed 
measure was not based upon an international standard of the relevant 
international organization, the OIE, and the measure did not meet the 
requirements of Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.39 Article 3.3 permits 
WTO members to maintain standards that are higher than international 
standards, but only if they are based upon science or are a "consequence 
of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines 
to be appropriate" and are based upon risk assessments. 
Australia countered that it did not claim that its measure on salmon 
imports was based upon OIE standards.40 After all, OIE standards did 
not exist for all of the 24 diseases from which Australia was seeking 
protection, and the OIE had no guidelines for salmon as a specific prod-
uct.41 Australia contended that the lack of OIE guidelines for all of the 
24 diseases meant in effect that no appropriate OIE guideline existed 
upon which Australia could base its measure.42 
The panel's report, which was released on June 12, 1998, did not 
address Canada's claims concerning Australia's failure to base its mea-
sure upon OIE standards. Rather, the panel found that Australia was in 
violation of the SPS Agreement as it ( 1) did not base its salmon import 
regulation upon a risk assessment (in violation of Article 5.1 and thus by 
extension Article 2.2, which requires that SPS measures be based upon 
scientific principles); (2) was applying arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions in the levels of SPS protection for measures for different situations, 
i.e., was applying more restrictive measures to imports of salmon than to 
imports of ornamental live fish although the latter posed higher risks,43 
which resulted in a disguised restriction on international trade (in viola-
tion of Articles 5.5 and 2.3); and (3) was maintaining an SPS measure 
37. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 1.4. 
38. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at <J[<J[ 4.52 and 4.209. 
39. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 3.2. 
40. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 8.45. 
41. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at CJ[ 8.46. Of the 24 diseases from which 
Australia contended it sought protection, two were included on the OIE's list of "Notifiable Dis-
eases" and four were on the OIE's "Other Diseases" list. See also Australia - Salmon Panel, supra 
note 7, at 'I 2.24. 
42. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at'{ 4.104. The panel stated that lack of OIE 
guidelines for all of the 24 diseases did not make irrelevant the existence of OIE guidelines for 
some of the diseases. See also Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I 8.46. 
43. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I'll 8.137 and 8.160. 
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that was more trade-restrictive than necessary to reach Australia's ap-
propriate level of SPS protection (in violation of Article 5.6).44 As the 
panel found that Australia was violating these provisions, the panel 
stated that it "[saw] no need to further examine Canada's other claims 
under ... Article 3."45 
While the Australia-salmon panel decision did not tum directly 
upon an international standard, the OIE' s guidelines figured prominently 
in the arguments of both Canada and Australia. In addition, the panelists 
looked to the OIE for guidance when addressing other issues, such as 
whether Australia presented the panelists with a risk assessment. 46 
2. The WTO Appellate Body Decision. 
Australia announced on July 22, 1998, that it would appeal the 
panel's decision,47 and the Appellate Body of the WTO released its re-
port on the salmon dispute on October 20, 1998. While the Appellate 
Body struck down some of the findings contained in the panel's report, 
the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision that Australia's policy 
regarding the importation of salmon violated that country's obligations 
under the SPS Agreement. Namely, the Appellate Body, like the panel, 
found that Australia's policy as applied to ocean-caught salmon contra-
vened Australia's obligations under Article 5.1 as the relevant measure 
was not based upon a risk assessment, and therefore, Australia's policy 
also violated Article 2.2, which requires that SPS measures be based 
upon scientific evidence.48 The Appellate Body upheld the panel's find-
ing that Australia, by maintaining unjustifiable distinctions in levels of 
SPS protection in different situations, was imposing a disguised restric-
tion on international trade in violation of Articles 5.5 and 2.3.49 The 
Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that Australia's measure as 
applied to ocean-caught salmon was more trade restrictive than neces-
sary, and thus in violation of Article 5.6, as the panel premised its find-
ing upon the wrong SPS measure; i.e., the panel addressed Australia's 
heat treatment for salmon as opposed to Australia's ban on the importa-
tion of salmon.5° Further, due to a lack of adequate facts in the record, 
44. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'l'I 9.1, 8.52. 
45. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 1 8.184. 
46. See Australia - Salmon Panel, supra note 7, at 'I'll 8.70, 8.71, 8.78, and 8.80. 
47. See World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes, at 5 
(visited Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>. 
48. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 123-24 
49. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 85-86, 93, and 124. 
50. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 124. 
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the Appellate Body was unable to determine whether Australia's import 
prohibition was inconsistent with Article 5.6.51 
The Appellate Body limited its examination to the findings of the 
panel, and as the measures of the OIE did not play a prominent role in 
the panel's decision, the Appellate Body did not examine issues directly 
related to the OIE. However, as with the panel, the Appellate Body 
looked to the OIE's guidelines when determining whether Australia's 
measure was based upon a risk assessment. 52 
C. The Japan - Agricultural Products WTO Panel Report. 
The panel's decision in the Japan-agricultural products dispute did 
not rely directly upon the international standards, guidelines, or recom-
mendations of the Codex, OIE, or IPPC, and none of these organizations 
were named in the findings or conclusions of the panel. However, the 
IPPC' s risk assessment guidelines were discussed in the factual section 
of the panel report, in the arguments of the parties, and in the panel's 
consultation with its scientific experts. 
1. Background of Dispute. 
On April 7, 1997, the United States requested consultations with 
Japan regarding Japan's approval process for the importation of certain 
agricultural products. 53 The United States alleged that Japan prohibited 
the importation of individual varieties of some agricultural products un-
til each variety had been tested for the required quarantine treatment. 54 
For example, instead of requiring that apples imported from the United 
States meet Japan's quarantine requirements concerning a certain plant 
pest, the codling moth, Japan mandated that testing be conducted on 
each variety of apple before different varieties could be imported. 55 
Thus, even though Japan had approved the importation of certain "red 
delicious" apples as the United States had proven that apples of this 
variety could be effectively treated for the codling moth, the United 
States was unable to export other varieties, such as "Fujis" or 
"Braeburns."56 The United States claimed that it took from two to four 
years to conducts the necessary tests, these tests were expensive, and 
that Japan's policy adversely impacted U.S. agricultural exports and vio-
51. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 124. 
52. See Australia - Salmon Appellate Report, supra note 7, at 74. 
53. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at <J[<J[ 1.1, 4.23. 
54. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 1 1.2. 
55. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 11 1.2, 4.23. 
56. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at Table 2, p. 15. 
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lated Japan's obligations under the SPS Agreement.57 Japan claimed 
that its policies were consistent with the requirements of the SPS 
Agreement. 58 
2. Findings of the Panel. 
The panel determined that Japan's policy contravened that coun-
try's obligations under the SPS Agreement as Japan's measure, as ap-
plied to applies, cherries, nectarines, and walnuts, was not based upon 
scientific evidence, in violation of Article 2.2, and was more trade re-
strictive than necessary in violation of Article 5 .6. 59 In addition, as Ja-
pan's measure was not published, the panel held that Japan was in 
violation of Article 7 and Annex B .1, both of which concern trans-
parency. 60 According to press reports, Japan intends to appeal the find-
ings of the panel. 61 
3. The IPPC and the Panel Report. 
The United States contended that Japan had failed to base its policy 
upon risk assessments and that Japan was thus in violation of Article 
5.1.62 Japan claimed, however, that it had conducted such assessments 
under the procedures set forth in the risk assessment guidelines of the 
IPPC.63 The panel provided a detailed description of the IPPC's guide-
lines,64 and these guidelines figured prominently in the arguments of 
both the United States and Japan concerning the issue of risk assess-
ments.65 In the end, the panel decided not to address the issue of 
whether Japan's policy was based upon risk assessments as required in 
Article 5 .1 as the panel had already found that Japan was in violation of 
Article 2.2 as its measure was not based upon scientific evidence.66 
IV. THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION. 
Of the standards established by the three international organizations 
named in the SPS Agreement, those of the Codex have perhaps the 
greatest potential to lead to conflicts among WTO members. 
57. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'll 1.2, 4.23. 
58. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 3.3. 
59. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 9.1. 
60. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 9.1. 
61. Doug Carder, Ruling may open market, THE PACKER, Nov. 2, 1998, at IA, col. 2. 
62. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 3.1. 
63. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 4.144. 
64. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'll 2.29-2.33. 
65. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll'l! 4.143-4.169. 
66. See Japan - Agricultural Products, supra note 8, at 'll 8.63. 
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A. Background on the Codex. 
The Codex establishes standards relating to human health, and its 
standards can concern additives, contaminants, and veterinary drug and 
pesticide residues in foods. 67 The Codex was founded in 1962 by the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and 
the World Health Organization (WH0).68 It currently has 162 member 
countries and is based in Rome. 69 The stated goal of the Codex is "to 
guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and 
requirements for foods, to assist in their harmonization and, in doing so, 
to facilitate international trade."70 
Most of the work of the Codex is conducted through its various 
committees, which consist of delegates from its member states. Exam-
ples of these committees are the Committee on Food Additives and Con-
taminants and the Committee on Processed Fruits and Vegetables.71 
Standards of the Codex are established through a lengthy eight step pro-
cess that provides members with the opportunity to comment on the pro-
posed standards.72 Throughout the Codex's history, most of its 
standards have been adopted by consensus.73 The Codex's standards, 
guidelines, and principles fill 28 volumes, and the Codex has established 
3200 maximum residue levels for pesticides alone since 1962.74 
B. Recent Controversial Codex Decisions. 
As the standards established by the Codex relate to human health, 
they have caused more concerns for the populations of members of the 
WTO than have the standards of the IPPC and OIE, which deal respec-
tively with plant and animal health. Controversy increasingly surrounds 
67. See generally Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the 2 J'1 Session, List of Stan-
dards and Related Texts Adopted by the 21st Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
ALINORM 95/37 (July 8, 1995) [hereinafter Codex 21'1 Report]. 
68. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Codex Office, 
Codex Home Page, (visited Dec. 18, 1997) <http://www.usda.gov/fsis/codex/index.htm>. 
69. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Latest News, (visited Aug. 4, 1998) <http:// 
www.fao.org/W AICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/codex/lnews.htm>. 
70. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, This is Codex Alimentarius 2 (2d ed.). 
71. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the 22nd Session, Appendix V: Confir-
mation of Chairmanship of Codex Committees, ALINORM 97/37 (June 28, 1997) [hereinafter 
Codex 22"ct Report]. 
72. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards 
and Related Texts (The Codex "Step Procedure"), (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ 
waicent/faoinfo/economic/esn/codex/procedl .htm.> 
73. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.69, see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.66. 
74. Supra note 70, at 2. 
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the establishment of certain Codex standards, and the adoption of Codex 
standards through consensus can no longer be assumed. 
1. Beef Hormones. 
The first indication of such controversy following the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round occurred with the non-consensus approval of maxi-
mum residue levels for five growth promoting hormones, which would 
become the focus of the beef hormone disputes at the WTO, at the 
Twenty-First Session of the Codex in July 1995, just seven months after 
the implementation of the SPS Agreement. At the request of the United 
States, a secret vote was held on these standards, and they were ap-
proved with 33 delegates favoring their adoption, 29 opposing them, and 
7 delegates abstaining from the vote. 75 
Following the vote, the Observer of the European Communities 
stated that the secret vote was unfortunate as it deviated from the Co-
dex's goal to operate transparently.76 The Observer also said that the 
vote brought into question the validity of the Codex's standards and that 
the European Communities might reconsider its participation in this 
body.77 The delegations of the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom dissociated themselves from parts or all of 
these remarks.7s 
The European Communities would later argue before the WTO 
panels in the beef hormone disputes that the failure of the Codex to 
adopt the beef hormone maximum residue levels through consensus 
demonstrated the very controversy of using these standards.79 The Euro-
pean Communities also stated that Codex members were accustomed to 
adopting non-binding measures and were unaware that these standards 
for beef hormones would in effect become mandatory for the member 
states of the European Communities through the operation of the SPS 
Agreement and the DSU.80 The panels held, however, that nothing in 
the SPS Agreement requires that votes on the measures of the relevant 
75. See Codex 21'1 Report, supra note 67, at «JI 45. 
76. Id. at «JI 46. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.69, see Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, 
supra note 5, at «JI 8.66. 
80. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.71, see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at «JI 8.68. The Appellate Body in the beef hormone dispute held that the 
voluntary standards of the relevant international organizations have not become mandatory stan-
dards for WTO members through the operation of the SPS Agreement. Members may maintain 
SPS measures that are higher than international standards if these measures are based upon risk 
assessments. See Beef Hormone - Appellate Report, supra note 6, at «J[«I 165, 177. 
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international organizations be by consensus, so the European Communi-
ties' argument was irrelevant. 81 
2. Twenty-Second Session of the Codex. 
The Twenty-Second Session of the Codex was held in Geneva in 
June 1997 and provided further examples of disagreements over the 
adoption of new standards. The release of the interim panel reports in 
the beef hormone disputes only one month before this session most 
likely influenced the decisions that were made there. 82 
a. Bovine Somatotropin. 
Bovine somatotropin (BST) is injected into dairy cows and in-
creases their milk production.83 Its use is common in some major dairy 
producing countries, such as the United States. 84 At the Twenty-Second 
Session of the Codex, a vote was held on a draft standard for maximum 
residue levels for BST. In the debates preceding the vote, the Codex 
was divided into two groups: those who sought to adopt the draft stan-
dard at Step 8 of the Codex's standard-setting process and those who 
favored postponing consideration of its adoption pending the reevalua-
tion of scientific information. 85 
The delegations that favored adopting the BST standard contended 
that thorough scientific evaluations of BST had already been conducted 
by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives and Con-
taminants (JECFA) and the Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs 
in Foods (CCRVDF), no new scientific evidence had been presented at 
the Codex meeting, and therefore a reevaluation was not needed. 86 
These delegations contended that the adoption of the draft standard 
would logically follow the conclusions of the JECFA and CCRVDF 
while also liberalizing trade by preventing the adoption of unfounded 
trade barriers. 87 
Those delegations opposing the adoption of the standard, as well as 
an observer from a non-governmental organization, Consumers Interna-
81. See Beef Hormone - Canada Panel, supra note 5, at 'J[ 8.72, see Beef Hormone - U.S. 
Panel, supra note 5, at 'I 8.69. The Appellate Body did not address the issue of non-consensus 
decisions by the relevant international organizations in its report for the beef hormone dispute. 
82. See Beef Hormone - U.S. Panel, supra note 5, at 'J[ 1.10. 
83. H. Allen Tucker, Michigan State University, Department of Animal Science, Safety of 
Bovine Somatotropin (bST), at 1, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.canr.msu.edu/dept/ans/ 
mdrx224.html>. 
84. Id. 
85. See Codex 22nd Report, supra note 71. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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tional, claimed that new evidence demonstrated that the administration 
of BST can increase the likelihood of viral and bacterial infections and 
mastisis in cattle, which could lead to the further usage of antibiotics in 
dairy cattle. 88 Delegations also argued that factors besides science 
should be taken into consideration, and the delegation of the Nether-
lands, representing the views of the European Communities' member 
countries, as well as the observer from Consumers International, claimed 
that consumers were opposed to the use of BST.89 
Upon a motion of the Netherlands, a vote was held to postpone the 
consideration of the adoption of the proposed BST maximum residue 
level pending the reevaluation of the scientific information and an exam-
ination of other factors, most likely including consumer preferences.90 
This resolution passed with 38 members voting for it, 21 delegations 
against it, and 13 countries abstaining.91 The member states of the Euro-
pean Communities, as well as most countries seeking admission to the 
European Communities, voted in favor of the resolution while the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were among the 
countries opposing its adoption. 92 
b. Natural Mineral Waters. 
Discussions on a draft standard for natural mineral waters at the 
Twenty-Second Session of the Codex were also controversial and re-
sulted in a close vote. As reported out of the Codex Committee on Nat-
ural Mineral Waters in October 1996, this draft standard did not permit 
microbial treatments of natural mineral water.93 Instead, the draft stan-
dard comported with the traditional means of producing natural mineral 
waters in Europe, a process which protects the purity of water by bot-
tling it at its source. 94 Some delegations supporting the adoption of the 
standard stated that they would not oppose the creation of another stan-
dard for bottled waters besides "natural mineral waters."95 Countries 
opposing the adoption of the draft natural mineral water standard, such 
as Japan, expressed concerns about an international standard that would 
prohibit the use of microbial treatments as certain conditions, presuma-
bly including water quality, vary throughout the world.96 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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Perhaps recognizing the influence of the European Communities 
over countries seeking admission to it, Japan requested that secret bal-
lots be used when a roll call vote was proposed for this draft standard, 
but Japan's proposal was rejected by a show of hands.97 In the actual 
vote on the adoption of the proposed standard, some 33 countries voted 
for the resolution while 31 voted against it, and 10 delegations ab-
stained. 98 The member states of the European Communities and most 
other European countries voted in favor of the draft standard.99 
Following the vote, the delegates of 16 countries expressed their 
reservations about this new standard. 100 The United States issued a 
statement denouncing it as a possible threat to public health and a non-
tariff trade barrier as it imposes restrictive requirements on the bottling 
of water. 101 The vote on natural mineral waters also caused several 
delegations to reiterate that the Codex should attempt to reach major 
decisions through consensus.102 
After the adoption of the standard for natural mineral waters, the 
Codex assigned the Committee on Natural Mineral Waters with the task 
of developing a draft standard for packaged water other than natural 
mineral waters. 103 
C. Future Codex Standards. 
It is likely that non-consensus decisions will become more common 
in the standard-setting process of the Codex. 104 With the heightened 
importance of Codex standards, the circle of those who follow this body 
closely has grown beyond scientists and select government officials and 
now includes others, most notably environmentalists and consumer ad-
vocates. The Codex is in the process of formulating draft standards on 
genetically modified organisms (GM Os), and GM Os will almost cer-
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. While the panels in the beef hormone disputes found no requirement for standards 
to be consensually agreed upon, a future WTO panel may or may not be asked to consider the 
consistency of standards decided by simple majority voting in these non-WTO entities with Arti-
cles IX and X of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
103. See Codex 22nd Report, supra note 71. 
104. Further examples of non-consensus decisions of this international body might be pro-
vided at the next Codex session. The Twenty-Third Session of the Codex will begin in Rome on 
June 28, 1999. Source: Codex Alimentarius Commission, Timetable of Codex Sessions 1998-
1999, (visited Aug. 4, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/W AICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/co-
dex/timetab.htm>. 
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tainly become one of the next areas of controversy in the Codex. 105 Pro-
ponents and opponents of foods obtained through biotechnology are 
likely examining how they might be able to attain their goals through the 
Codex process. 
v. THE INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION. 
While the Codex has experienced controversy surrounding the 
adoption of some of its standards since the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement, the IPPC is undergoing a major structural change to prepare 
it for its new responsibilities in the world's trading system as a result of 
the SPS Agreement. 
A. Background on the IP PC. 
The IPPC came into force in 1952, and some 105 countries were 
contracting parties to it as of November 1997 .106 According to Article I 
of the IPPC, the purpose of this organization is to secure "common and 
effective action to prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants 
and plant products and to promote measures for their control." 107 The 
IPPC was amended in 1979, and the amended text became operative in 
1991.108 
A Secretariat was established for the IPPC in 1989 by the FAQ 
Conference, but the Secretariat did not begin functioning until 1993 dur-
ing the Uruguay Round. 109 The purpose of the Secretariat is to coordi-
nate international efforts concerning plant quarantine issues, to compile 
information concerning plant pest outbreaks, and to provide technical 
assistance to members on phytosanitary issues. 110 Like the Codex, the 
105. See Codex 22m1 Report, supra note 71. See also U.S Department of Agriculture, Food 
Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Codex Office, Draft United States Comments, Proposed Draft 
Recommendations on the Labeling of Foods Obtained through Biotechnology, (visited Dec. 18, 
1997) <http://www.usda.gov/fsis/code:x/biotech.htm>. 
106. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Conference, 291h Session, 
Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, C 97117 at 1 (Nov. 18, 1997). 
107. With a minor exception, a comma between "plant products" and "and to promote," the 
purpose of the IPPC as proposed in the 1997 text is identical to the one found in the 1979 text. 
108. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/ 
secretar.htm>. 
109. Id. 
110. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, FAO technical assistance 
and the Uruguay Round Agreements 14-15 (1997); Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations, Activities (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/ 
Activit.htm>. 
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IPPC Secretariat is located in Rome and operates under the aegis of the 
FAo.111 
Another major function of the IPPC Secretariat is to coordinate the 
implementation of the IPPC through its nine regional organizations. 112 
These organizations are the Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commis-
sion, the Caribbean Plant Protection Commission, the Comite Regional 
de Sanidad Vegetal para el Cono Sur, the European and Mediterranean 
Plant Protection Organization, the Inter-African Phytosanitary Council, 
the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, the North American Plant Protec-
tion Organization, the Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad 
Agropecuaria, and the Pacific Plant Protection Organization. 113 Some of 
the regional organizations of the IPPC have traditionally been more ac-
tive in establishing international phytosanitary standards, albeit regional 
ones, than the IPPC Secretariat itself. 114 
B. Revision of the IP PC. 
Of the three international organizations named in the SPS Agree-
ment, the IPPC is currently the least prepared to fulfill the role envi-
sioned by the WTO. Recognizing this, the FAO Conference decided in 
1995 to amend the IPPC to adapt it to the new responsibilities antici-
pated for it in the SPS Agreement. 115 In 1996, an Expert Consultation 
proposed a revised draft of the IPPC, which was distributed to con-
tracting parties for comments. 116 After a review by members of the 
IPPC, a proposed revised convention was presented to the IPPC Confer-
ence in Rome in November 1997.117 The revised IPPC will go into ef-
111. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/ 
secretar .htm>. 
112. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Regional Cooperation, (vis-
ited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/RegCoop.htm>. 
113. Id. 
114. For example, the North American Plant Protection Organization, which was founded in 
1976 and is comprised of plant quarantine officials of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, has 
traditionally been active in creating non-binding phytosanitary standards, such as risk assessment 
and export certification standards. Comments of Jean Hollebone, Executive Committee Member 
for Canada to the North American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO), North American Plant 
Protection Organization: Abstracts of the 21" Annual Meeting and Colloquium on Quarantine 
Security, Bulletin No. 15, at 3 (Oct. 24, 1997); See also NAPPO, NAPPO - The North American 
Plant Protection Organization: Its Purpose, Goals, Projects, and Policies, (visited Aug. 11, 1998) 
<http://www.nappo.org/brochure_E.htm>. 
115. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 1. 
116. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, News and Events, (visited 
Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pq/News.htm>. 
117. See generally Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 
106, at 1. 
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feet after two-thirds of the IPPC's contracting parties approve it. 118 
Amendments that are deemed to create new obligations for members 
will go into force for each contracting party upon acceptance of such 
amendments. 119 
The most significant change proposed in the amendments is the cre-
ation a new standard-setting focus for the IPPC. 120 The IPPC itself does 
not contain provisions relating to the establishment of standards. In-
stead, an ad hoc standard-setting process, which is viewed by many as 
unsatisfactory, was developed in 1993 for the IPPC and was approved 
by the FAO Conference.121 Consequently, unlike the Codex and the 
OIE, the IPPC does not have an extensive history of establishing new 
standards. The revisions will provide the IPPC with the structure and 
the capability to become a major standard-setting organization like the 
Codex and the OIE. 
The amendments propose other notable changes to the IPPC. 
While the provisions of the current IPPC do not mention a Secretariat, 
the suggested revisions do. 122 The proposed revisions also codify within 
the IPPC some of the principles of the SPS Agreement, such as the use 
of risk assessments, pest free areas, and harmonization. 123 Both the cur-
rent and proposed amended conventions contain non-binding dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 124 
With its new standard-setting focus, the decisions of the IPPC 
could possibly become more controversial as has occurred with some 
Codex decisions. Indeed, the Secretariat of the IPPC expressed concerns 
during the IPPC revision process that trade matters were possibly being 
viewed as more important than plant health issues. 125 However, block 
voting within the revised IPPC might be less effective than within the 
Codex. Under Article X.5 of the proposed revised IPPC, if consensus 
cannot be reached on a matter that comes before the IPPC' s Commission 
on Phytosanitary Measures, decisions will be made by a two-thirds ma-
jority, not by a simple majority .126 
118. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 2. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 12. 
121. Id. at 1, 3. 
122. Id. at 14. 
123. Id. at 6. 
124. Id. at 14. 
125. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Sum-
mary of the Meeting Held on 8-9 October 1996: Note by the Secretariat, at 10, G/SPS/R/6 (Nov. 
14, 1996). 
126. See Revision of the International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 106, at 13. 
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VI. THE INTERNATIONAL OFFICE OF EPIZOOTICS. 
Unlike the Codex and IPPC, the OIE has not experienced major 
changes in either its standard-setting process or its structure since the 
implementation of the SPS Agreement in 1995. 
A. Background on the O/E. 
The OIE coordinates studies of animal diseases, informs govern-
ments of animal diseases, and assists in the harmonization of regulations 
involving the trade of animals and animal products. 127 It was created in 
1924 and is based in Paris. 128 As of May 1998, some 151 countries were 
members of this organization. 129 The OIE differs from the Codex and 
IPPC in that it does not operate under the auspices of the FAO of the 
United Nations. 
The International Committee of the OIE meets at a minimum once 
a year. 130 This committee, which is comprised of all delegates, approves 
new standards of the OIE. 131 The OIE has five regional commissions 
that encourage cooperation on animal health issues in their respective 
geographical areas.132 
The OIE is the oldest veterinary association in the world and is 
similar to the Codex in that it too has a long history of establishing 
advisory international standards. 133 OIE standards are found in the 
OIE' s Code, which lists standards for international trade, and Manual, 
which provides the standard diagnostic procedures for animal diseases 
as well as vaccine standards related to international trade. 134 The Fish 
Diseases Commission of the OIE issues a separate Code and Manual 
pertaining to aquatic life.13s 
127. International Office of Epizootics, The OIE: The World Organization for Animal 
Health (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http://www.oie.int/overview/a_oie.htm>. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. International Office of Epizootics, Structure of the OIE (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http:// 
www .oie.int/overview /a_struc.htm>. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SER-
VICE, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL SERVICES - TRADE 
SUPPORT TEAM (1997). 
134. International Office of Epizootics, International Standards (visited Aug. 11, 1998) 
<http://www.oie.int/Norms/ A_norms.htm>. 
135. Id. 
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B. The OIE Since Implementation of the SPS Agreement. 
The OIE has undergone relatively few changes since the implemen-
tation of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Unlike the Codex, the OIE has 
not to date experienced significant controversy when creating standards. 
This lack of controversy can be attributed in part to the nature of the 
risks which the OIE addresses; the establishment of standards for ani-
mals and animal products does not evoke the same concerns for most 
people as do the standards of the Codex, which relate to human 
health. 136 And in contrast to the IPPC, the OIE prior to the Uruguay 
Round Agreements was well suited to establish new standards, so the 
OIE was not in need of revision. 
Perhaps the most significant action of the OIE since 1995 has been 
the formalization of the relationship of the WTO and the OIE through an 
exchange of letters. 137 These letters state in part that the OIE and WTO 
agree to consult regularly on matters of mutual interest; to be invited to 
and to participate in relevant meetings held by one another; to exchange 
information on a regular basis; and to assist in providing technical assist-
ance to developing countries. 138 The agreement proposed in these letters 
was approved by the OIE's International Committee in May 1997139 and 
by the General Council of the WTO in October 1997. 140 
C. The OIE and Impending Disputes. 
While the profile of the OIE is possibly lower than those of the 
Codex and IPPC when considering changes to these organizations since 
the implementation of the SPS Agreement, the function of the OIE in the 
WTO system was demonstrated in the Australia-salmon dispute. The 
prominence of this international organization in resolving trade disputes 
will most likely increase in the near future. Bovine spongiform en-
136. Although the OIE monitors and establishes standards for animal health, its standards 
can also indirectly impact humans. For example, the OIE monitors for bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy (BSE) as this disease is carried by cattle. At the same time, however, the OIE's 
regulations concerning BSE also affect humans as its regulations apply to cattle products, which 
are ultimately consumed by humans. 
137. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Sum-
mary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 May 1996: Note by Secretariat, at 2-3, G/SPS/R/5 (July 9, 
1996). 
138. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Draft Agreement Between the World Trade Organization and the Office International des Epizoo-
ties, G/SPS/W/61 (May 22, 1996). 
139. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Deci-
sions Relevant to the SPS Agreement Taken by the OIE International Committee at the 651h Gen-
eral Session, at 1, G/SPS/GEN/24 (July 9, 1997). 
140. World Trade Organization, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Report 
(1997) of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, at 1, G/L/197 (Oct. 27, 1997). 
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cephalopathy (BSE), also known as "mad cow disease,"141 has signifi-
cantly impacted the international trade of live cattle and beef products, 
and this disease could lead to conflicts involving the WTO. 
One such dispute that could result in WTO challenges concerns the 
European Communities' proposal to ban the use of "specified risk 
materials" (SRMs) that might pose risks regarding transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathies.142 The European Communities has based its 
proposal in part upon OIE standards which state that certain materials, 
such as bovine brains and spinal cords originating from countries with 
cases of BSE, should not be traded internationally. 143 Such a ban by the 
European Communities could restrict billions of dollars worth of U.S. 
pharmaceutical exports to Europe as many pharmaceutical products are 
encased in gelatin capsules composed partly of SRMs.144 U.S. officials 
have claimed that the European Communities' prohibition of such prod-
ucts from the United States is not scientifically justified, and thus vio-
lates the European Communities' obligations under the SPS Agreement, 
as the United States regularly monitors for BSE according to OIE guide-
lines.145 The future of the European Communities' proposed ban is in 
doubt due to questions of EC member states regarding the risks of BSE 
in SRM products. 146 As a result of concerns of EC member states, as 
well as those of the United States, the European Communities has 
delayed the implementation of its SRM proposal, and a decision on the 
proposal might be made in 1999.147 The OIE is in the process of exam-
ining such risks, and any new EC policy on SRMs would likely reflect 
the OIE's opinion. 148 
European countries might take issue with the U.S. policy of restrict-
ing the importation of live cattle, meat, and meat products from Euro-
pean countries where BSE might be present, yet has not been 
detected. 149 The United States implemented such a policy in 1998 as it 
contended that some European states either have less restrictive import 
141. International Office of Epizootics, 651h Annual General Session of the International 
Committee of the Office International des Epizooties (May 30, 1997). 
142. Barshefsky Letter on SRM Ban, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sep. 19, 1997. 
143. European Commission Decision on Animal Products, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, August 15, 
1997. 
144. Barshefsky Letter on SRM Ban, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sep. 19, 1997. 
145. Id. 
146. Unanimous EU Council Vote Means End to SRM Ban in Short Term, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Apr. 3, 1998. 
147. EU Likely to Delay SRM Ban Again to Continue Preparing New Regime, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Nov. 6, 1998. 
148. Id. 
149. See Restrictions on the Importation of Ruminants, Meat and Meat Products From Ru-
minants, and Certain Other Ruminant Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 406 (1998). 
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laws than the United States or fail to monitor adequately for this disease. 
OIE standards concerning BSE could potentially become an issue in 
such a dispute. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
The SPS Agreement of the WTO has expanded the visibility of the 
Codex, IPPC, and OIE in the international trading system. The SPS 
Agreement encourages WTO members to base their SPS measures upon 
the standards of these organizations. The Codex and OIE are currently 
well situated to perform the roles provided for them in the SPS Agree-
ment. Although the IPPC in its present form is capable of fulfilling the 
responsibilities given to it in the SPS Agreement, the IPPC's proposed 
revisions, if approved, would facilitate the IPPC' s ability to support the 
WTO system. 
As demonstrated by the EC-beef hormone, Australia-salmon, and 
Japan-agricultural products decisions of the WTO, the settlement of ma-
jor international trade disputes can tum at least in part upon the stan-
dards of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE as these organizations' standards are 
viewed as international benchmark standards under the SPS Agreement. 
With the heightened importance of international standards, the standard-
setting process of the Codex has become more controversial, and con-
sensus on its new standards can no longer be assumed. The establish-
ment of standards by the IPPC and OIE in the future might also become 
more political, and possibly less scientific, as an indirect result of the 
SPS Agreement. Such a trend might ultimately damage the credibility 
of the Codex, IPPC~ and OIE. 
It is unclear how great a role the specific trade agendas of member 
countries, as opposed to scientific evidence, might affect the develop-
ment of future standards. All three organizations have lengthy approval 
processes for new standards, which should prevent the adoption of nu-
merous scientifically questionable standards. In addition, although dele-
gates to these organizations are government officials, they are scientists 
as well, and their professional integrity as well as the goodwill that has 
developed among them when working together might also limit the po-
tential of the Codex, IPPC, and OIE to create standards that are scientifi-
cally unsound. 
Although the possible increased politicization of the standard-set-
ting processes of these organizations is regrettable, it is perhaps inevita-
ble. Under the SPS Agreement, the outcome of international trade 
disputes can be influenced by the conformity of a WTO member's SPS 
measures with international standards. Therefore, one can expect that 
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many governments, to the extent they can, will try to protect their cur-
rent or possible future SPS measures. This will likely lead to less con-
sensus within the Codex, IPPC, and OIE than existed during the time 
prior to the implementation of the SPS Agreement. If lack of consensus 
becomes the norm, the harmonization objective will likely be harmed. 
Such a development may lead to increased calls for consensus standard-
setting within the three entities. 
27
Stewart and Johanson: The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization and Internation
Published by SURFACE, 1998
